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CONSIDERING LAW AND 
MACROECONOMICS 
ANNA GELPERN* & ADAM J. LEVITIN**
I 
INTRODUCTION
The worst financial and economic crisis to hit the world’s richest economies 
since the Great Depression inspired a flood of scholarship that straddled the 
disciplines of law and macroeconomics. With few exceptions, this crisis 
scholarship did not set out to build a new interdisciplinary movement and did not 
claim the legacy of earlier efforts to mine the intersection of law and 
macroeconomics.1 What are we to make of this moment ten years on? Could
Law and Macroeconomics (LawMacro) be an important new turn in legal and
economic thought, a casual interdisciplinary tryst on the margins of a hundred-
year flood, or, paraphrasing one commentator, this generation’s Freudian
pushback against the venerable Law and Economics movement?2 
This symposium Issue of Law and Contemporary Problems offers a sampling
of views from a September 2019 Conference at Georgetown Law on the prospects 
for LawMacro as a field of inquiry. Our principal goal for the Conference and
this Issue has been to consider the scope for more systematic, sustained 
Copyright © 2020 by Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin. 
This Foreword is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* Professor of Law and Agnes N. Williams Research Professor, Georgetown University Law Center and 
Nonresident Senior Fellow, Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics.  
** Agnes N. Williams Research Professor and Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.   
This project has been marinating for years. We have amassed debts of gratitude to many exceptionally 
kind colleagues; we cannot possibly list them all. Some indulged our LawMacro fantasies for hours, even
as they had their doubts; others encouraged us on this quest a decade ago (and likely forgot by now); yet
others did not discourage us hard enough. The Conference and this Issue would not have happened 
without them. We owe special thanks to the following, none of whom are responsible for our take on
LawMacro or any of our mistakes: the wonderful L&CP editors, workshop and panel participants at
Georgetown, Vanderbilt, Cornell, and the Canadian Law and Economics Association, participants at the
Law and Macroeconomics Conference at Georgetown Law on September 27–28, 2019, and Jonathan 
Baker, Michael S. Barr, Lily Batchelder, Margaret Blair, Olivier Blanchard, Danny Bradlow, William W. 
Bratton, Chris Brummer, Neil H. Buchanan, Heather Casey, Jérémie Cohen-Setton, Peter Conti-Brown,
Kevin E. Davis, Peter Diaz, Brent Futrell, Erik Gerding, Heather Gerken, Mitu Gulati, Sean Hagan, 
Robert Hockett, Rachel Jackson, Greg Klass, Yair Listokin, Patricia McCoy, John Mikhail, Saule 
Omarova, Katharina Pistor, Adam Posen, Randal  K. Quarles, Heidi Schooner, Howard Shelanski, 
Leland Smith, David Snyder, Lawrence H. Summers, David Super, Daniel K. Tarullo, Joshua 
Teitelbaum, Edwin M. Truman, Nicolas Veron, Robin West, Janet Yellen, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer. 
1. See infra Part II. 
2. See Gregory Klass, Comments on Yair Listokin, Law and Macro: What Took So Long? at the
Conference on Law and Macroeconomics at Georgetown University Law Center (Sept. 27, 2019). 
BOOK PROOF - FOREWORD (DO NOT DELETE) 3/23/2020 1:40 PM       











   
 
 
    












ii LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:i
engagement between law and macroeconomics, distilling post-crisis research 
trends, and identifying avenues for future collaboration. 
We left the Conference convinced that such engagement was worthwhile 
and—equally—that defining the proper scope, place, and content of LawMacro
was a work in progress. The ultimate prospects of LawMacro will depend on its 
ability to generate fresh insights about both law and macroeconomics, to identify 
good public policies, and to open new political possibilities for societies riven by 
extreme inequality, and grappling with demographic, technological, and climate
shocks.3 
Part I of this foreword briefly looks back at the Law and Economics 
movement (LawMicro), which reinvented itself in the 1960s and went on to 
transform U.S. law scholarship since the early 1970s. The movement’s reach and 
influence have made it the presumptive reference point for any project that
implicates law and economics in the United States and, to a lesser extent, in other
legal traditions.4 
Some contributions to the Conference and this Issue fit comfortably in the 
Law and Economics tradition; others challenge it. We see no need to stake out a 
position either way. Because LawMicro has ignored macroeconomics altogether 
until very recently, it has left ample room for gap-filling and extensions. 
Meanwhile, LawMacro presents an unusual opportunity to reconsider the 
interdisciplinary relationship in a more fundamental way.
Microeconomists study the behavior of people and firms in discrete markets, 
where price adjustment leads to equilibrium and where government is absent, 
except as a distortion or a fix for market failure. The threshold innovation of 
LawMicro was to claim law—all of it—as an object of economic analysis.5 By 
definition, law (like agriculture or restaurant management) has nothing to say to 
microeconomics in this conversation.
Macroeconomists may share microeconomists’ basic ideas about decision-
making,6 but they operate on a different scale and under different baseline 
3. Cf.  PETER HALL, THE POLITICAL POWER OF ECONOMIC IDEAS: KEYNESIANISM ACROSS 
NATIONS 7 (Peter Hall ed., 1989) (“In some cases, [Keynesian ideas] . . . altered the terms of political
discourse in such a way as to legitimate a variety of policies and make new combinations of political 
forces possible.”).
 4. E.g., THE ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & ECONOMICS 13 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit 
De Geest eds., 1999), http://encyclo.findlaw.com/4800book.pdf [https://perma.cc/DL42-J6Z5]. 
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ix (1972); see also RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 29–30 (9th ed. 2014) (“[T]he hallmark of the ‘new’ law and economics . . . 
is the application of economics to the legal system across the board . . . .”).
6. In the early years of the LawMicro revolution in the United States, macroeconomic models did 
not derive the behavior of aggregates from microeconomic models for individual and firm behavior. For 
its part, microeconomics had trouble accounting for persistent unemployment and other observed 
macroeconomic phenomena. A 1976 paper by Robert Lucas posed a foundational challenge for
macroeconomic theory, arguing that people’s expectations of economic policy intervention would
prompt behavior changes and ultimately frustrate policy. Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Econometric Policy
Evaluation: A Critique, in  THE PHILLIPS CURVE AND LABOR MARKETS (Karl Brunner & Alan H.
Meltzer eds., 1976). A succession of model revisions in response to the Lucas critique led to growing
convergence between macro- and microeconomists’ decision-making models; however, the project drew
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conditions. Macroeconomists study the behavior of economies made up of 
multiple markets and political units. They focus on politically salient aggregates, 
such as unemployment, inflation, and growth.7 In their world, prices are sticky, 
distortions and externalities are commonplace, and—whether they like it or 
not—governments manage the business cycle in the short run and output growth 
in the long run. Multiple, overlapping legal systems are at work in a
macroeconomy, constructing actors and markets and mediating interactions 
among them.8 
Because macroeconomic theories do not purport to explain all or even most 
human behavior, the scope for law as an object of macroeconomic analysis is 
relatively narrow. On the other hand, law—both public (for example, 
constitutional, administrative) and private (for example, contract, property)— 
has much to say about the structure and operation of economic systems. Law and
macroeconomics have come to share a preoccupation with instability and
stability, and crisis and crisis governance, which remains an awkward fit in 
LawMicro. LawMacro therefore holds out the possibility of a two-way exchange 
that could enrich both disciplines. 
Part II considers examples of post-crisis law scholarship straddling law and 
macroeconomics that could portend a sustainable stream of LawMacro research.
Much, but not all, of this work has clustered in the area of financial regulation 
and has understandably focused on financial stability. As the decade wore on, 
lingering effects of the crisis, including persistently sluggish growth, low wages, 
declining labor participation, visible wealth and income inequality, and the
apparent limits of conventional fiscal and monetary policy in mature economies,
led scholars—most notably Richard Posner and Gary Becker, pillars of the
LawMicro movement—to revisit macroeconomics.9 Simultaneously, prominent 
fresh criticism after the financial crisis that began in 2007. For a textbook overview, see OLIVIER
BLANCHARD, MACROECONOMICS 501–08 (7th ed. 2017). At the time of this writing, the search for 
“microfoundations” of macroeconomics is far from over. For an accessible overview, see, for example, 
M.C.W. Janssen, Microfoundations, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Steven N.
Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) and Jérémie Cohen-Setton, Microfoundations in 
Macroeconomics, BRUEGEL: BLOG (Mar. 9, 2012) http://bruegel.org/2012/03/microfoundations-in-
macroeconomics/ [https://perma.cc/GCP4-DS86] (summarizing the microfoundations debate). See also
Olivier Blanchard, Do DSGE Models Have a Future? (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. Policy Brief No. 16-
11, 2016), https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/pb16-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/KG23-5TVP]; 
Matthew O. Jackson & Leeat Yariv, The Non-Existence of Representative Agents (Ctr. for Econ. Policy 
Research Discussion Paper No. DP13397, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=3302656 [https://perma.cc/ZM6C-E5BF]. 
7. See Bruno Meyerhof Salama, The Art of Law & Macroeconomics, 74 U. PITT. L. REV. 131, 135 
(2012) (describing macroeconomics as a field concerned with “aggregates that are politically salient”). 
8. Randal Quarles, Vice Chair for Supervision, Fed. Reserve, Speech on Law and 
Macroeconomics: The Global Evolution of Macroprudential Regulation at the Law and Macroeconomics 
Conference at Georgetown University Law Center (Sep. 27, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/speech/quarles20190927a.htm [https://perma.cc/J9LB-9LS6] (observing that both law and 
macroeconomics “are centrally concerned with systems” beyond individual actor incentives). 
9. See Gary S. Becker & Richard A. Posner, The Future of Law and Economics, 10 REV. L. &
ECON. 235, 238–40 (2014) (pointing to “the emerging and exciting subfield of macro law and economics” 
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iv LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:i
macroeconomists were reconsidering the legal underpinnings of macroeconomic 
institutions and policies.10 
Part III suggests a taxonomy of approaches to LawMacro as a field, along
with avenues for future scholarship represented at the Conference and in this 
Issue. These fit broadly under two rubrics: (1) macroeconomic analysis of law, 
and (2) legal analysis of macroeconomics. The first is an extension of LawMicro.
The second expands on recent legal and interdisciplinary analysis of 
macroeconomic institutions and phenomena, and explicitly addresses the values 
and political choices at stake in macroeconomic policy decisions. 
We conclude with a note on the challenges of inter and intra-disciplinary 
engagement in LawMacro. 
II
LAWMICRO IN RETROSPECT
Scholars have drawn connections between the disciplines of law and
economics since the early twentieth century.11 LawMicro as a movement captured 
legal imaginations half a century ago, and proceeded to shape research, policy,
and jurisprudence on subjects ranging from contracts to family, criminal, and
constitutional law. The application of microeconomic reasoning to law in 
general—beyond discrete areas traditionally understood as “economic,” such as 
antitrust and public utility regulation—was a central contribution and an 
important predicate of its success. The seminal treatise in the field explains:
The law is divided into numerous fields … traditionally studied in isolation from one
another, and within each field the rules tend also to be studied as separate, often self-
enclosed, bodies of thought. Yet a relative handful of economic doctrines … can, by 
their repeated application across fields of law and legal rules, describe a great deal of 
the legal system and enable the student to develop a more coherent sense of the 
system—to grasp the relation of its parts and understand its essential unity, and having 
done so to deal competently with new issues as they arise.12 
To be sure, LawMicro brought more than ambition and intellectual firepower 
to its imperial project. Yair Listokin writes in this Issue that the movement was
at the outset a well-funded, brand-conscious interest group effort to mold law 
as a “major frontier” and citing economic research on interactions between legal systems for 
macroeconomic variables). 
10. See, e.g., PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER 392 (2019) (“[W]e are clear that, intrinsically,
central banks are not guardians of either the high values or integrity of the democratic rule-of-law state.”)
(emphasis in original).
 11. See generally John R. Commons, Law and Economics, 34 YALE L.J. 371 (1925). Scholars often
trace the roots of Law and Economics to the utilitarianism of English philosopher Jeremy Bentham in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See POSNER (2014), supra note 5, at 29; ROBIN WEST,
NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 98 (2011). 
12. POSNER (2014), supra note 5, at xxi-xxii; see also Alain Marciano & Sophie Harnay, Posner, 
Economics and the Law: From Law and Economics to an Economic Analysis of Law, 31 J. HIST. ECON.
THOUGHT 215 (2009) (describing the transformation of “law and economics” into “economic analysis of 
law” partly as a product of Posner’s collaboration with Gary Becker). 
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scholarship and legal institutions after a way of microeconomic thinking.13 It 
specifically targeted laity—law professors, students, and ultimately law-makers,
judges, and practitioners—for training in the basics of economic analysis, in order 
to organize the legal enterprise around the central goal of market efficiency and
a strong presumption against government intervention. 
The result was a singular triumph. Looking back, the movement’s early
fervor, theoretical and ideological cohesion, non-technical orientation, and 
welcoming disposition feel vaguely Orwellian. LawMicro has mellowed over
time. Growth brought an influx of PhD economists,14 an increasingly empirical
orientation, demand for methodological rigor, and a measure of ideological 
diversity, to the movement.15 Competing approaches to interdisciplinary
economic analysis of law emerged periodically; however, even critical
interventions such as Law and Socio-Economics defined themselves by reference
to LawMicro—reflecting its dominance while contesting virtually everything else
about it.16 
LawMicro’s hold on the Law and Economics label is impressive in light of its 
origins in an ideologically tinged slice of the discipline.17 Its lifelong neglect of 
macroeconomics is a case in point. Every few years since the early 1990s, a law 
review article would emerge to comment on the macro gap in “Law and 
Economics,” and propose to fill it, to no avail.18 Some of these articles tried to 
13. See Yair Listokin, Law and Macro: What Took So Long?, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 
2020, at 141, 155–56 .  
14. POSNER (1972), supra note 5, at ix; Becker & Posner, supra note 9, at 239.  
15. POSNER (2014), supra note 5, at 34. 
16. See generally, e.g., Robert Ashford, Introduction to Socio-Economics: An Ethical Foundation for 
Law-Related Economic Analysis, 49 AKRON L. REV. 287 (2016).  
17. Id.; see also ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO
THEORY AND PRACTICE 3 (1990) (“[W]hat generally passes under the rubric of economic analysis of law 
is, for our purposes, only one component of a much richer study of comparative perspectives . . . .”).  
18. See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security, Generational Justice, and Long-Term Deficits, 58 
TAX L. REV. 275, 278 (2005) (“While the legal literature that relies on microeconomics has mushroomed 
over the last two decades or so, macroeconomics has remained largely in the background.”); John J.
Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, Law and Macroeconomics: Employment Discrimination Litigation over 
the Business Lifecycle, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 709, 709 (1993) (“For the past two decades the law and 
economics movement has been one of the most influential forces in the legal academy. Its practitioners 
have relentlessly sought to unleash microeconomic insights on formerly pristine areas of legal doctrine. 
This Article . . . represents a departure from the previous literature in that it considers the impact of 
macroeconomic phenomena . . . .”); David Driesen, The Societal Cost of Environmental Regulation: 
Beyond Administrative Cost Benefit Analysis, ECOLOGY L.Q. 546, 563–64 (1997) (“Traditionally, most
law and economics scholarship has focused on microeconomic analysis. . . .”); Mark Kelman, Could 
Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and Macroeconomics, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1993)
(“When legal scholars and law students discuss the impact of economics on their understanding of law, 
they invariably think about microeconomics, not macroeconomics.”);  Douglas Kysar, Sustainability,
Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (“Legal economic
analysis has traditionally focused on the application of microeconomic theory to questions of legal 
import. Scholars have generally regarded macroeconomic effects of legal rules as lying beyond the
purview of the legal decisionmaker’s jurisdiction.”); Steven A. Ramirez, The Law and Microeconomics
of the New Deal at 70, 62 MD. L. REV. 515, 520 (2003) (“The implication of this is the need to expand law 
and economics beyond mere microeconomic efficiency, which has been the near exclusive focus of law 
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vi LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:i
explain why LawMacro had failed to take root.19 Was it because macroeconomics 
was itself a messy, unsettled field in the formative years of Law and Economics?
Because it did not produce explanatory theories that mapped onto law in
general? Or because it sounded too complicated to the average law school 
graduate?
The “Law and” part of the “Law and Economics” label is similarly puzzling
as to its claim to all of economics. LawMicro is not about law, but rather 
(following the title of Posner’s treatise) is an application of economic analysis.
Theories, methods, and normative content in Law and Economics all come from 
microeconomics, supplying a frame to judge law from the outside. Economics 
anchors and disciplines law. In contrast to economics, law in LawMicro has no
theory, method, or values of its own; it is a decision setting like agriculture or 
restaurant management, equally susceptible to the marginal cost-benefit calculus. 
LawMicro in the 1970s was cutting-edge law, but by definition could not be
cutting-edge economics. To this day, LawMicro remains an application of 
economic principles to law with the goal of revealing something new about the 
law—not about economics. A Law and Economics chair is a far more exotic 
proposition for an economics department than for a law school.20 
As LawMicro assimilated insights from other disciplines, such as finance,
political science, and psychology, its relationship with law remained a one-way 
street. The behavioral revolution in economics qualified some LawMicro
assumptions about information and human rationality. However, it did not create 
space in LawMicro for the more traditionally “legal” considerations of justice, 
equity, representation, or legal process. When legal thought and legal institutions 
assimilated norms from other fields, such as philosophy, psychology, or political 
science, LawMicro would subsume it all in the welfare calculus.21 
LawMicro’s failure to recognize the many ways in which law constituted
economic systems, combined with its focus on static efficiency and neglect of 
macroeconomics, left it unprepared for the biggest financial crisis since the 1930s. 
The crisis created an opening for scholarship that engaged with law and 
macroeconomics outside the traditional LawMicro paradigm.
and economics within the legal academy—an expansion that explicitly recognizes the need to search for
legal structures to support higher levels of macroeconomic performance.”). 
19. See Kelman, supra note 18, at 1216–19 (considering obstacles to the emergence of Law and
Macroeconomics as a field of study); Salama, supra note 7. In an ironic twist, the opening chapter of
Posner’s seminal volume, The Economic Analysis of Law, tries to rescue lawyers’ perception of 
economics from the stereotype of a “forbiddingly mathematized study of . . . macroeconomic phenomena
remote from the day-to-day concerns of the legal system.” POSNER (2014), supra note 5, at 3.
20. From this perspective, it is natural for law faculties to hire academic economists with no formal 
legal training and equally inconceivable for an economics department to hire a law scholar with no formal
graduate training in economics. 
21. See generally, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto
Principle, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEG. STUD. 331 (2003) (engaging with responses to 
their argument that welfare considerations alone should drive social policies, including “legal rules”). 
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III
A MACRO MOMENT
Financial crises in the United States and Europe that began in 2007, and the
Great Recession that followed, made the importance of macroeconomics salient 
among law scholars, and focused economists’ attention on the roles and
limitations of legal institutions. Four discernible flavors of “macro-woke” law 
scholarship emerged in the post-crisis decade: (1) financial regulation and
financial stability, (2) analysis of macroeconomic institutions, (3) international
economic coordination, and (4) Law and Macroeconomics.
Newly-ubiquitous terms such as “macroprudential” and “financial stability” 
describe public intervention to prevent systemic financial crises and, less often,
deep recessions—as distinct from traditional (now “microprudential”) 
intervention to protect against individual firm failure. The term 
“macroprudential” first surfaced in a U.S. law review article in 1985 in connection 
with the international debt crisis that threatened to bankrupt the entire U.S. 
banking sector.22 A few more isolated mentions followed; we found fewer than 
twenty articles in English-language law journals that used the term as late as 2008. 
Use of the term jumped to 100 articles in 2009, and peaked at approximately 150 
in 2013.
Regulation of financial institutions, a relatively sleepy area of U.S. law 
scholarship at the start of the twenty-first century, became an epicenter of the
financial stability revival. Securities and corporate law scholarship also saw a 
crisis-driven output spike. The research traced crisis transmission channels,23 
identified institutional design fragilities and regulatory failures,24 and evaluated 
22. Charles F. Meissner, Crisis as an Opportunity For Change: A Commentary on the Debt 
Restructuring Process, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 613, 616 (1985). The term “macro-prudential”
appears to have circulated in official circles before it was first included in an official government release
in 1986. Piet Clement, The Term “Macroprudential”: Origins and Evolution, BIS Q. REV. 59 (Mar. 2010). 
23. See generally, e.g., ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2016); 
HAL SCOTT, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION: PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS
(2016); Anna Gelpern & Erik F. Gerding, Inside Safe Assets, 33 YALE J. ON REG. (2016); Kathryn Judge,
Fragmentation Nodes: A study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
657 (2012); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63
STAN. L. REv. 539 (2011); Steven Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193 (2008); Sarah P. Woo, 
Regulatory Bankruptcy: How Bank Regulations Cause Fire Sales, 99 GEO. L.J. 1613 (2011).  
24. See, e.g., Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed The “Business 
of Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009) (tracing the relaxation of restrictions on banks dealing in 
derivatives). See also KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS
CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 13 (2011) (describing regulatory failures in the
housing finance market and beyond); MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING 
FINANCIAL REGULATION 29 (2016) (pointing to short-term money-like debt outside the banking system
as the cause of financial instability); Adam Levitin & Susan Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 
100 GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012) (proposing that the financial crisis was the result of both an excess of mispriced 
mortgage finance and a mortgage-finance supply glut); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Reforming Financial 
Regulation to Address the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 707 (2009) (examining the 
regulatory causes and consequences of too-big-to-fail financial conglomerates). 
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viii LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 83:i
crisis response25 and financial reform proposals.26 
A second strand of post-crisis work has focused on the design and operation
of macroeconomic institutions. Central banks, which had largely (and bizarrely) 
escaped legal scrutiny until that point, were the most notable post-crisis research
subjects.27 Tax law scholars produced a crop of articles assessing automatic fiscal
stabilizers.28 Studies of the budgetary process and U.S. budget institutions 
sometimes explicitly mentioned macroeconomic concerns, though this was not 
the norm.29 Continued economic and political fallout from the Great Recession
25. In an interesting and important twist, scholars drew parallels between legal decision-making in 
military and economic emergencies. Although it precedes the latest crisis, we are partial to the treatment 
in OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AIOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS: EMERGENCY POWERS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 17–85, 242 (2006). For a post-crisis example, see generally Eric A. Posner & 
Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State: 9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 
76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613 (2009); see also Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The
Government’s Response to Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463, 502–03 (2009) (describing
government-facilitated acquisitions of financial institutions as a (decidedly micro) mode of crisis
intervention); Anna Gelpern, Financial Crisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2008–09)
(describing a framework for government policy choices in response to a crisis).
 26. See, e.g., DAVID SKEEL JR., THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-
FRANK ACT AND ITS (UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES (2011) (criticizing post-crisis reforms and
highlighting moral hazard risks); John Coates, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies 
and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015) (questioning the viability of traditional cost-benefit analysis
and its judicial review in financial regulation); Adam J. Levitin, Prioritization and Mutualization: 
Clearinghouses and the Redundancy of the Bankruptcy Safe Harbors, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM.
L. 129 (2015) (observing that clearinghouses perform the financial stability functions of certain
bankruptcy safe harbors, and advocating for safe harbor repeal); Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, 
Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1630 (2011) (proposing to institutionalize four types of 
“regulatory contrarians” as a check on administrative groupthink and a means of making financial 
regulation more nimble); Paolo Saguato, The Ownership of Clearinghouses: When Skin in the Game Is
Not Enough, the Remutualization of Clearinghouses, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 601, 601 (2017) (considering
the impact of ownership structure on systemic risk); Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of
Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 GEO. L.J. 387 (2013) (arguing that clearinghouses increase 
systemic risk from derivatives trading); Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and
Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-To-Fail-Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011) (criticizing Dodd-Frank 
for failing to end subsidies for large, systemically risky financial institutions).
 27. See PETER CONTI-BROWN, THE POWER AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE
254–61 (2016) (discussing the evolving structure and functions of the Federal Reserve system); see also
ANNELISE RILES, FINANCIAL CITIZENSHIP: EXPERTS, PUBLICS, AND THE POLITICS OF CENTRAL 
BANKING (2018) (analyzing the political work of central banks); Morgan Ricks, John Crawford & Lev
Menard, Central Banking for All: A Public Option for Bank Accounts, THE GREAT DEMOCRACY 
INITIATIVE (2018) (arguing for opening Federal Reserve for the public). 
28. See Brian D. Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative
Minimum Tax as a Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 187, 187 (2010) (“[W]e argue that
policymakers should consider so-called “automatic” stabilizers, such as are found in the federal tax
system . . . .”); see also Lily Batchelder et al., Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax 
Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 23 (2010); David Kamin, Legislating for Good Times and Bad, 54 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 201, 201 (2017) (proposing automatic-adjustment mechanisms to diversify risk by establishing
pre-set policy measures like Social Security, unemployment, and cap-and-trade as expanded
countercyclical triggers). 
29. The 2011 U.S. debt ceiling standoff between the Congress and President Barack Obama inspired 
a different sort of crisis law scholarship, explicitly addressing the checks and balances in the U.S.
Constitutional system. See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least
Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 
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has led some scholars to undertake a fundamental reassessment of the public and
private law that shapes modern financial systems and their constituent 
institutions.30 
When financial crises spill over national borders—as they often do—they
pose additional policy and regulatory coordination challenges for governments. 
A third flavor of macro-woke scholarship concerns itself with such challenges. 
International economic law scholarship has shown an unusual level of macro 
awareness since long before the latest crisis, likely thanks to the experience of
repeatedly confronting crisis coordination problems around the world.
Influential writing on inflation and foreign exchange arrangements appeared in 
the 1980s in response to domestic and international financial turmoil.31 More 
recent contributions in this area consider the form and output of soft law
institutions such as the Group of Seven, the Group of Twenty and the Basel 
Committee for Bank Supervision;32 exchange rate arrangements; the law’s 
contribution to sustainable development and long-term growth;33 trade and 
investment regimes; and formal institutions charged with crisis management, 
COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1178 (2012) (discussing the separation of powers problems associated with a 
President ignoring the debt ceiling); Howell E. Jackson, The 2011 Debt Ceiling Impasse Revisited, in IS 
U.S. GOVERNMENT DEBT DIFFERENT 55 (F. Allen et al. eds., 2012) (noting that some commentators 
believe that Section Four of the Fourteenth amendment prohibits debt ceiling increases). On the subject 
of budget institutions more broadly, see, for example, Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a
Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 YALE L.J. 2182 (2016) (discussing the historical consideration of 
macro alongside micro concerns by the Executive Office of the President).
 30. See, e.g., RICKS, supra note 24, at 1(“I argue that our existing monetary framework is outdated
and defective . . . .”); Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L.
REV. 1143, 1146 (2017) (recasting the financial system as a state franchise). See generally  CHRISTINE 
DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM (2015); KATHARINA
PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL (2019). 
31. See  KEITH ROSENN, LAW & INFLATION xxxvii (1982) (describing legal responses to inflation
based on the experience of Brazil in the 1980s); see also Kenneth Dam, From the Gold Clauses to the 
Gold Commission: A Half Century of American Monetary Law, U. CHI. L. REV. 504 (1983) (analyzing 
the legal and institutional implications of abandoning the gold standard in the 1930s and the gold
exchange standard in the 1970s). 
32. See generally, e.g., CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2015)
(explaining why and how “soft law” dominates international finance, but not other areas of international 
economic law); Michael S. Barr, Who’s In Charge of Global Finance?, 45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 971 (2014)
(offering a critical overview of “international finance architecture”); Stavros Gadinis, The Financial 
Stability Board: the New Politics of International Financial Regulation 48 TEX. INT’L L.J. 157 (2013) 
(analyzing the Financial Stability Board as a political intervention opportunity); Daniel K. Tarullo, Rules,
Discretion, and Authority in International Financial Reform, 4 J. OF INT’L. FIN. REFORM 613 (2001) 
(evaluating the tradeoffs between rules-based and discretionary administrative regimes in light of the 
“authority gap” in international economic policy coordination); Pierre-Hughes Verdier, The Political
Economy of International Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405 (2013) (presenting a skeptical realist 
account of soft law in international finance). 
33. See generally ALVARO SANTOS, WORLD TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW REIMAGINED: A
PROGRESSIVE AGENDA FOR AN INCLUSIVE GLOBALIZATION (2019); THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006). For a 
“microfoundations” perspective, see generally Gillian Hadfield & Barry Weingast, Microfoundations of 
the Rule of Law, 17 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 21 (May 2014). 
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such as the International Monetary Fund.34 Since 2009, scholars have also paid 
attention to developments surrounding central bank swap lines,35 new or
reformed institutions, such as the Financial Stability Board, and informal
arrangements to manage particular shocks.36 
Macro-aware and macro-curious post-crisis law scholarship in the United
States drew primarily on the work of economists, weaving it together with 
established corporate, financial regulation, and LawMicro literatures.37 This new
work has steered clear of the Law and Macroeconomics label and of claiming 
roots in the earlier law literature expressly linking the two.38 The works of
Listokin and Salama are rare exceptions, and the best examples of the fourth
strand of post-crisis scholarship, which explicitly embraces the Law and
Macroeconomics label. Salama’s contribution bridges domestic and international 
domains, incorporating comparative and Law and Development concerns.39 
Listokin’s book, articles, and the related symposium in the Yale Journal on 
Regulation,40 extend Law and Economics to the macroeconomic realm.
Listokin’s book considers the law’s fiscal and monetary policy functions as part 
of its descriptive and normative project, but focuses its prescriptive energy on 
establishing law as a last-resort tool to stimulate aggregate demand in 
recessions.41 Apart from the keynote by economist Jason Furman, who asks
broadly what law could do for macroeconomics, the 2017 symposium articles 
follow Listokin to analyze the law as a countercyclical policy instrument.42 
We see the “macro turn” in law scholarship as long-overdue and valuable. 
Lawyers benefit from understanding the impact of legal institutions and reform 
interventions on aggregate demand, supply, prices, and expectations, which
34. See, e.g., Adam Feibelman, Law in the Global Order: The IMF and Financial Regulation, 49 
N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 687 (2017) (analyzing the International Monetary Fund as a universal 
regulatory institution with global reach). 
35. See Colleen Baker, The Federal Reserve’s Use of International Swap Lines, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 603
(2013) (analyzing Federal Reserve swap lines that gave foreign central banks access to U.S. dollars in
crisis).
 36. See Katharina Pistor, Governing Interdependent Financial Systems: Lessons from the Vienna 
Initiative (Columbia Law Sch., Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 396, 2011) (describing
informal arrangements that kept foreign banks from leaving Eastern European countries in a financial
and economic crisis). 
37. See generally Judge, supra note 23.  
38. See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security, Generational Justice, and Long-Term Deficits, 58 
TAX L. REV. 275, 278 (2005) (acknowledging an overlap in analytical framework between the article and
Law and Macroeconomics without embracing the term); Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to
Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling
Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1175 (2012). 
39. See generally Bruno Meyerhof Salama, Macroeconomic Analysis of Law Versus Law and
Macroeconomics, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2020, at 181. 
40. See generally Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of Recessions, 
34 YALE J. ON REG. 791 (2017). 
41. See generally YAIR LISTOKIN, LAW AND MACROECONOMICS: LEGAL REMEDIES AND
RECESSIONS (2019). 
42. See, e.g., Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Should Regulation be Countercyclical? 34 YALE 
J. ON REG. 857 (2017) (considering whether countercyclical regulation is desirable). 
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would help them formulate better arguments and design more effective policies. 
Nonetheless, we worry that when it comes to integrating macroeconomic and
legal insights, the emerging literature is not ambitious enough, and potentially 
fragile. As it has developed thus far, the most expansive vision of LawMacro 
could be taken for an exotic subfield of LawMicro,43 importing discrete bits of 
economic theory to support Keynesian stimulus, while missing opportunities to 
reconsider the relationship between law and economics to help both. We see
contributions to this Issue as an experiment in going beyond this frame.
IV 
IN SEARCH OF LAWMACRO
Microeconomics is about the behavior of people and firms in markets for 
goods and services; it is for efficient allocation of resources among them. In
microeconomics, government is seen as either a source of distortion or a response
to market failure, but mostly it is absent—all else equal. Early LawMicro took 
this basic insight and ran with it, supplying the intellectual basis for laissez-faire
policies in the 1970s and ‘80s with funding from the ideologically-aligned Olin
and Searle foundations.44 It is unsurprising, then, that the original conception of
LawMicro took the presence of regulation to mean that something was amiss in
the cosmos.
In contrast, macroeconomics is about the behavior of economies, comprising
multiple markets interacting in complex ways. It is for managing the business 
cycle—reducing the incidence, depth, and pain of economic downturns—and for 
long-run output growth. In macroeconomics, government is a central character; 
even the most politically conservative macroeconomists must contend with its 
role. Sound governmental intervention is the point. Macroeconomists surely care 
about welfare, incentives, and resource allocation; however, as we noted in Part 
I, they operate with different units of analysis. These units are neither natural nor
uniform; they are a function of politics and legal design. Law constitutes national 
and regional economies and their governments, and sets the ground rules for 
decision-making within them. Law also governs individual markets and mediates 
the relationships among them. At any given time, multiple legal systems are at
work in a macroeconomy and could affect its performance.45 Many of these 
systems and their constituent institutions were not designed to solve economic 
problems; they reflect norms and political imperatives from a wide range of
sources, with a heavy dose of historical accident. Law scholarship and law 
practice, each in its own way, are remarkably good at synthesizing theories and
methods from different fields and translating these inputs into institutional 
43. See Becker & Posner, supra note 9, at 238 (stating that it is time for “an emerging and exciting 
subfield of macro law and economic”). 
44. See Yair Listokin, Law and Macro: What Took So Long?, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1,
2020, at 141, 155–56; Klass, supra note 2. 
45. See Quarles, supra note 8.
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designs. The LawMicro project cabined the law’s messy eclecticism, anchoring it 
in economic thought. In contrast, macroeconomists might find that eclecticism 
useful, particularly if they are dealing with novel public policy problems and are 
already amenable to considering law and institutions.  
Macro-awareness among law scholars historically has coincided with periods 
of macroeconomic upheaval, beginning with the Great Depression and the birth 
of modern macroeconomics as a discipline in the 1930s.46 Legislators, regulators,
and practitioners at the time responded to the stock market crash, the banking 
crisis, and to economic shocks at home and abroad.47 However, when the cycle
turned, scholarly interest fizzled without coalescing around a set of research
questions, or any theoretical or normative commitments. 
Contemporary efforts to engage law and macroeconomics as a field of study
came six decades after the Great Depression, in the 1990s. At the end of the 
twentieth century, macro-aware law scholarship sought to address traditional 
business cycle problems—such as shielding workers from economic downturns.48 
Just as before, no Law and Macroeconomics movement followed. 
For those who think that some version of LawMacro is worth pursuing—as
we do—contributions to the Conference and this Issue consider what it should 
do differently to become a sustainable field of inquiry. If LawMacro is to take 
root, what should it be about, and what should it be for? And if it were to be a 
more balanced, two-way proposition, what can LawMacro do for law and
macroeconomics, respectively? The Articles in this Issue suggest two potential 
approaches to these questions: (1) macroeconomic analysis of law, and (2) law 
and macroeconomic policy. 
A. LawMacro as Macroeconomic Analysis of Law 
Extending LawMicro, macroeconomic analysis of law takes law as an object 
of analysis. The central research question is whether law makes sense from a
macroeconomic standpoint: does it account for the business cycle? Does it 
promote growth,49 or reduce instability? Paraphrasing Becker’s 2014 framing, this 
version of LawMacro would study interactions between legal systems and 
macroeconomic variables,50 and prescribe law reforms accordingly. 
Several contributions to this Issue would fit such a model of LawMacro
scholarship, as would Yair Listokin’s book, discussed in Part II, advocating 
countercyclical legal stimulus as a tool of last resort, particularly in economic 
46. See generally Ramirez, supra note 18. 
47. See Dam, supra note 31, at 504 (putting Roosevelt’s dollar policy in the context of the domestic 
banking crisis and the global financial crisis). 
48. See Kelman, supra note 18, at 1224 (considering the scope for protecting workers from 
macroeconomic downturns).  
49. See generally RICHARD COOTER & AARON EDLIN, THE FALCON’S GYRE: LEGAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC INNOVATION AND GROWTH (2014), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/ 
library/resources/cooter.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ43-U2PJ]. 
50.  Becker & Posner, supra note 9, at 239–40. 
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downturns.51 The Article by Patricia McCoy and Susan Wachter makes the case
for macro-awareness in mortgage regulation, traditionally understood as a
microeconomic endeavor.52 The co-authors underscore the critical role of 
mortgage credit in monetary policy transmission and highlight variations in the 
regional impact of U.S. housing finance regulation. The upshot is a need for a
macroeconomic, or at least macro-aware, mandate for the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau.
Contributions from former Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo and
Erik Gerding similarly investigate the relationship between financial regulation, 
credit, and economic cycles.53 Both take a cautious or downright skeptical view 
of countercyclical financial regulation. They push back at Listokin’s thesis 
indirectly—the book explicitly carves out financial regulation from its argument 
for countercyclical legal stimulus—but offer potentially generalizable
observations about the political economy of countercyclical regulation and the 
formidable information barriers to its effectiveness, among others.  
These works ask the same broad question: what regulatory intervention is 
desirable from a macroeconomic perspective, and what is the best way to design
it? A cross-cutting question here might address the law’s effectiveness at 
anchoring expectations: for instance, would it change if the law explicitly varied 
over time, beyond already-implicit contextual variation?54 Almost by definition,
theories of time-varying regulation are hard to test empirically: cycles take time
to run their course, while cross-country comparisons must contend with big legal 
and institutional differences. Formulating a workable empirical approach would 
itself be a valuable interdisciplinary project.  
As in LawMicro, law in this version of LawMacro is the object of analysis and 
a tool in pursuit of economic policy outcomes. Law scholarship on this model
should be relatively familiar and noncontroversial for the law audience, save for 
a threshold level of novelty or discomfort with macroeconomic concepts, ably
addressed in Listokin’s Article in this Issue,55 as well as in his book. 
B. LawMacro as Legal Analysis of Macroeconomics 
Another approach to LawMacro would zoom in on the legal, institutional,
and political assumptions behind macroeconomic policies. Beyond this 
descriptive enterprise, it would strive to broaden the range of plausible
institutional designs to satisfy macroeconomic policy and other societal 
objectives at the same time.  
51. See generally LISTOKIN, supra note 41.  
52. See generally Patricia A. McCoy & Susan M. Wachter, The Macroprudential Implications of the
Qualified Mortgage Debate, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2020, at 21. 
53. See generally Daniel K. Tarullo, Time-Varying Measures in Financial Regulation, 83 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2020, at 1; Erik F. Gerding, Against Regulatory Stimulus, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 1, 2020, at 49. 
54. See Salama, supra note 39, at 185 (discussing Brazil’s anti-inflation intiative in the 1990s); see 
generally DAVID MOSS, A CONCISE GUIDE TO MACROECONOMICS 67–85 (2d ed. 2014). 
55. See generally Yair Listokin, supra note 44. 
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The roundtable on financial crisis response at the Conference56 illustrated the 
different priors that lawyers and economists can bring to a shared policy project. 
Lawyers and economists, practitioners and academics, all worried about stability, 
legitimacy, and commitment, but in different terms. Where some sought 
flexibility for a presumptively benevolent government in crisis, others worried
more about legal regimes assimilating a permanent state of emergency. A call to 
harden legal constraints on governments known for chronic promise-breaking 
followed a discussion of governments deftly working around legal constraints. In 
his contribution to the Issue, Bruno Salama puts forward an “elasticity paradigm”
to bridge such gaps, pointing to what could be a fruitful line of theoretical and
comparative research.57 
Definitional and, unexpectedly, measurement problems loom large in legal 
analysis of macroeconomics. Peter Conti-Brown highlights the threshold
challenge of defining “institutions” in writing across movements and disciplines. 
His Article helps contextualize LawMicro, which emerged alongside other 
influential interdisciplinary movements relevant to legal and macroeconomic 
inquiry, raising the possibility of a LawMacro movement by another name
unfolding in a distant corner of the academic universe.58 
Daniel Hemel and Morgan Ricks highlight the stakes implicit in designing
elements of macroeconomic institutions and policies that are often taken for 
granted.59 Basic structural elements of payment systems, and equally basic 
approaches to measuring inflation, can have dramatic implications for stability, 
distribution, and ultimately for democracy. There is ample room for law as such 
to contribute to framing political debates and designing policies that are both just 
and effective. 
Other Articles in this Issue illustrate the rich spectrum of legal institutions 
implicated in macroeconomic policy. Gina-Gail Fletcher’s contribution points to
the possibility that private law—here, contracts—could become macro-
relevant.60 This too was a takeaway from the McCoy and Wachter Article on 
mortgage contracts discussed above.61 Fletcher argues that manipulation in the 
derivatives markets could pose a risk to financial stability. Whether it does is an 
important question for legal, as well as economic, analysis. Whether traditional 
securities law safeguards against manipulation would work under the 
56. Olivier J. Blanchard, Thomas C. Baxter Jr., Monica B. de Bolle, Oren Gross, and Sean Hagan
participated in this roundtable at the Conference. 
57. See Salama, supra note 39, at 187–93. But see GROSS & NÍ AIOLÁIN, supra note 25
(distinguishing approaches to emergency law-making among legal traditions, notably in France and the
United States). 
58. See generally Peter Conti-Brown, A New Study of Institutions: A Research Program for Law,
Macroeconomics, and History, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2020, at 157. 
59. See generally Daniel Hemel, Indexing, Unchained, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2020, at
83; Morgan Ricks, Money, Private Law, and Macroeconomic Disasters, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
no. 1, 2020, at 65. 
60. See generally Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Macroeconomic Consequences of Market Manipulation, 83 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2020, at 123. 
61. See generally McCoy & Wachter, supra note 52. 
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circumstances is a question of macroprudential regulation, along the lines we
discussed in the immediately preceding Part. Both are important open questions.
Antitrust policy is another example of potentially macro-relevant legal 
intervention.62 Antitrust law has increasingly become identified with a distinct set 
of microeconomic arguments, heavily invested in the workings of the price 
adjustment mechanism and ex post enforcement adjudication.63 As a result, its 
political and macroeconomic effects can go unseen and unquestioned.64 Legal 
analysis here could help identify structural and institutional factors with potential 
to affect long-term output,65 as well as macroeconomic policy transmission 
channels, and could predicate ex ante regulatory intervention.
Structure also looms large in Morgan Ricks’ contribution mentioned earlier,66 
and in Nadav Orian Peer’s Article on so-called “public purpose finance”— 
government lending that is macroeconomically significant, but designed to 
minimize conventional channels of accountability, in the gray zone between
government spending, credit, and taxation.67 Orian Peer’s argument goes to the 
perimeter of government and government decision-making; both are threshold 
issues for legal construction, definition, and measurement in countries around the 
world. Here, law creates a structure where high-stakes fiscal policy decisions can 
become invisible. The design challenge is to create alternative accountability 
channels that preserve the practical ability of the government to direct fiscal
resources to sound, but potentially unpopular policy causes. Central bank 
accountability research, as well as the experience with government development
banks around the world, offer useful lessons to that effect. 
Structural interventions of this sort add more context for the emphasis on 
legal systems in the Conference remarks of Federal Reserve Governor Randal 
Quarles, and the conversation between Chair Janet Yellen and former Federal
Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo. Analyzing the structures and interactions of 
multiple overlapping rules systems is what lawyers do. Current and former
Federal Reserve officials also shared different perspectives on the process norms 
implicated in financial regulation and supervision, pointing to another potential 
contribution for LawMacro: balancing values. 
62.  Lina Khan and Howard Shelanski discussed the evolution of antitrust law in the United States 
and the relevance of antitrust law to economic growth and other macroeconomic variables in response 
to her presentation, “The Case for Unfair Methods of Competition Rulemaking,” at the Conference 
(Sept. 28, 2019). 
63. See, e.g., Lina Khan & Rohit Chopra, The Case for Unfair Methods of Competition Rulemaking 
86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (arguing in favor of ex ante regulation and against the adjudication
model of antitrust enforcement). 
64. Compare Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1978) 
with Jason Furman, How Lawyers Can Help Macroeconomists in the Wake of Three Major Challenges, 
34 YALE J. ON REG. 709 (2017).
 65.  See generally COOTER & AARON EDLIN, supra note 49. 
66. See generally Ricks, supra note 59. 
67. See generally Nadav Orian Peer, Public Purpose Finance, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 
2020, at 101.  
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The question of LawMacro’s normative content—what is it for?—is relatively 
straightforward in its first, more traditional version. While it makes sense to ask,
following Salama and others, “which macroeconomics” might guide 
macroeconomic analysis of law, when the answer comes, it conveys the law’s 
marching orders. As we observed earlier, the law’s capacity to synthesize many
disciplinary perspectives and to translate them into institutional designs is its 
unique strength as a scholarly field and as a practice. The second version of 
LawMacro, Legal Analysis of Macroeconomics, can leverage this strength to 
engage more explicitly in balancing moral and political values as part of economic 
policymaking. In this Issue, Saule Omarova’s Article on the purpose of finance 
and the contribution from Steven Ramirez framing the justice imperatives of 
LawMacro, reflect this perspective.68 Both authors insist on orienting LawMacro
to sustainable human development, beyond economic growth and
microeconomic efficiency. Omarova starts from the economic literature on the 
relationship between finance and growth—which asks a subversive-enough
question, whether too much finance could be bad—and points to the fact that we
have yet to develop a robust vocabulary to judge the “macro-systemic” effects of 
financial innovation. Microeconomic virtues like market completion,
diversification, and price discovery quickly fill the linguistic and theoretical gap, 
and become political fuel for more finance and more socialized risk. Ramirez 
takes a long historical view, a reminder that LawMacro is only the latest turn in 
the law’s periodic crisis-driven dance with macroeconomics. He cautions that 
LawMacro as a legal academic enterprise would “solve very little of 
consequence” if it fails to alter the course of lawmaking “to vindicate the role of 
law as a public good” and a force for human development.69 
* * * 
The foregoing breakdown is simplified: as in all such endeavors, most of the
Articles in this Issue fit into more than one category, some obviously so. The goal 
is not to pigeonhole contributions or show that the legal analysis approach has a 
lot on its plate, but to tease out a plausible set of questions for interdisciplinary
research and sketch the contours of a possible research field. Such a sketch could, 
in turn, serve as a platform for a working paper series, further elaborating the 
field. Until then, we close with a few observations on interdisciplinary and
intradisciplinary research in this area. 
68. See generally Saule T. Omarova, What Kind of Finance Should There Be?, 83 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., no. 1, 2020, at 195, Steven A. Ramirez, The Emergence of Law and Macroeconomics: From 
Stability to Growth to Human Development, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2020, at 219. 
69. Ramirez, supra note 68, at 220–21. 
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V 
CONCLUSIONS
The LawMacro project has been underway for a long time, albeit without a
hashtag. A giant wave of financial crisis scholarship amplified its academic and 
policy salience. This Issue—and the accompanying the Conference at
Georgetown Law—aim to heighten awareness of cross-cutting preoccupations in
law and macroeconomics, casting a wide net to define a nascent field and bring 
stakeholders from both disciplines under one umbrella. This approach inevitably 
(and deliberately on our part) yields a spectrum of views on the proper scope and 
content of LawMacro. We are comfortable letting the questions marinate in this 
community and beyond before forcing them into a unified frame. We want to
avoid replicating the one-way disciplinary relationship between law and 
economics in LawMicro, because law can contribute to theory, policy, and
political discourse in this area.
One’s view of law’s contribution naturally depends on their understanding of 
the law, of the place of law scholarship, and their definition of macroeconomics. 
The range of possibilities is immense. However, intra-disciplinary specialization
may turn out to be a bigger obstacle to collaboration between law and 
macroeconomics. Law scholarship today is emphatically interdisciplinary, 
specialized, and paradoxically reluctant to engage in normative debates about big
ideas like justice. In this sense, LawMicro is not exceptional: scholars tend to 
gravitate to a limited set of relatively technical questions, and try to answer them 
with theories and methods from other disciplines. As a result, those already 
engaged in a conversation with a certain subset of economists (the financial 
regulation and financial stability cohort) may be willing to consider 
macroeconomics. Those who study constitutional and administrative law—and 
could add the most on the subject of political organization, governance, and the 
structure of government decision-making—may not see the payoff. The same 
goes for researchers in other areas of regulation, corporate law, tax law, and 
mainstream Law and Economics, who may echo Judge Posner’s intuition that 
topics such as output, inflation, and unemployment are simply too far removed
from those “day-to-day concerns of the legal system.”70 
We are cautiously optimistic for two reasons. First, there is now a critical mass 
of macro-aware, macro-relevant, and macro-curious law scholarship—including
both pre-and post-crisis contributions—and a community of researchers who find 
it interesting and worth pursuing. Second, substantive policy questions at the
intersection of the two disciplines remain salient even after the crisis has passed. 
This is bad news for the world: persistently low output growth; environmental, 
health, and technological shocks; migration; and extreme inequality destabilize 
70. POSNER (2014), supra note 5, at 3. We heard echoes of intradisciplinary concern from 
macroeconomists: while inflation is a core concept in macroeconomics, inflation measurement is a matter
for Public Finance, a separate subdiscipline. 
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societies and create demand for new policy tools just as established fiscal and 
monetary policy tools lose effectiveness. 
Demand for new approaches to macroeconomic problems is growing, but 
should these be legal approaches? We think so. As we have observed throughout 
this Foreword, macroeconomic institutions are legal constructs, more often than 
not designed with multiple non-economic objectives in mind. For example, 
blocked fiscal policy channels in the United States are a function of constitutional 
design; monetary policy transmission depends importantly on financial 
regulation, supervision, and the legal structure of the Federal Reserve System.
This particular form of fiscal federalism can yield destructive, pro-cyclical 
macroeconomic outcomes.71 The value of legal analysis is even more salient in
Europe, where macroeconomic controversies are litigated in constitutional 
courts, and in emerging market countries where economic emergencies are a
regular occurrence. The fact that many of the controversies focus on longer-term 
structural features of the macroeconomy, and not just the business cycle, expands 
the potential scope for legal intervention. 
In sum, the current “macro moment” looks like fertile ground for a broad-
based engagement between law and macroeconomics. There is no telling where 
it might lead. We hope that this Issue and the conversations begun at the 
Conference help enrich lawyers’ and macroeconomists’ understanding of each 
other’s thinking and inform better theory and policy at this challenging time.
71. See David Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2550 (2005) (noting 
that the transfer of countercyclical programs to state governments “is likely to undermine the 
effectiveness . . . of federal macroeconomic policy”). 
